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The ACA’s ContraceptiveMandate
Religious Freedom,Women’s Health,
and Corporate Personhood
The Supreme Court on June 30, 2014, decided Bur-
well v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc—a deeply divisive case.
Holding that the federal government cannot lawfully
mandate “closely held” for-profit corporations to pro-
vide contraceptive coverage, the Court split 5-4 along
ideological lines.1TheCourt thusenteredapoliticalquag-
mire at the intersection of religious freedom, women’s
health, and corporate personhood.
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires
specified employer group health plans to cover pre-
ventive care and screenings for women without cost-
sharing. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) rules mandate coverage of 20 Food and Drug
Administration–approved contraceptive methods.
However, HHS exempts religious employers (eg,
churches) but not for-profit organizations. HHS offers
religious nonprofits an “accommodation,” whereby
insurance companies exclude contraception coverage
from the employer’s plan, but the insurance compa-
nies must provide separate coverage without cost-
sharing to the employer, its health plan, or women.
In theHobbyLobbycase,3closelyheld for-profit cor-
porationsholdingChristianbeliefs that lifebeginsatcon-
ceptionchallengedthemandateof4contraceptionmeth-
ods they believe prevent a fertilized egg from attaching
to theuterus, tantamount toanabortion. These4meth-
ods include 2 forms of emergency contraceptive pill,
which can be taken within 3 to 5 days after sex, and in-
trauterine devices (IUDs), which are inserted into the
uterus to prevent pregnancy. The latter are long-acting,
reversible,andhighlyeffectiveformsofcontraceptivebut
can also be used for emergency contraception.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) prohibits government from “substantially” bur-
dening a person’s “exercise of religion”without a “com-
pelling interest”andrequiresthe“least restrictive”means
toachievethat interest.HoldingthatHHSviolatedRFRA,
the Court first found that RFRA applies to closely held
for-profit corporations. TheCourt reasoned that corpo-
rationsare“persons”capableof“exercisingreligious free-
dom.” JusticeAlito,writing for theCourt, saidRFRApro-
tects individuals—thecompany’s shareholders, officers,
and employees.
Having foundthatRFRAapplies tocorporations, the
Court said the contraception mandate “substantially”
burdens their religious freedoms.Themandate, accord-
ing to Justice Alito, coerces companies to fund services
towhich they aremorally opposed. TheCourt assumed
the government had a “compelling interest” in ensur-
ing reproductive servicesbut saidHHScouldachieve its
purpose less restrictively. The federal government, for
example, coulddirectly fund the4contraceptivemeth-
ods or use the same “accommodation” HHS offered to
nonprofit religious organizations, namely requiring in-
surers to cover those services.
Women’s Health,Well-being, and Equal Rights
The Court’s 49-page opinion is solicitous of corporate
rights and religious freedoms while mentioning women
only13times. Instarkcontrast,JusticeRuthGinsburg’sdis-
sentsymbolicallyquotesSandraDayO’Connor,theCourt’s
first female justice: “Theabilityofwomen
toparticipateequally intheeconomicand
social life of the Nation has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their re-
productive lives.”2JusticeGinsburg’spas-
sionate dissent reveals the virtually
unbridgeable fissure among the Jus-
tices, reflected inUSpolitics and culture.
Reproductive services are vital to women’s health
and lives,3 expanding their social and economic oppor-
tunities.Reproductiveservices reduceunintendedpreg-
nancies and facilitate treatment, with 99% of all sexu-
ally active women using birth control at some point.4
Poorwomen,moreover, areunlikely toafford reproduc-
tive services, especially long-acting contraceptionwith
high initial costs. JusticeGinsburgwrote, “the cost of an
IUD is nearly equivalent to a month’s full-time pay for
workers earning theminimumwage,” and “almost one-
third of women would change their contraceptive
method if costs were not a factor.” Reproductive free-
doms, of course, are also vital to families and society
given the high social costs of unplanned pregnancies.
A Clash Between Religious Freedom
andWomen’s Rights
The Court assumed the contraception mandate cre-
ated a “substantial burden,” deferring to the compa-
nies’ subjectivebeliefs,whichareunfounded in fact.The
4 contraceptivemethods to which they objected avert
pregnancy by delaying or preventing ovulation. Scien-
tific evidence does not support the claim that emer-
gencycontraceptionworksbypreventing implantation.5
Thecorporateowners remained free topractice their re-
The Court reasoned that corporations
are “persons” capable of “exercising
religious freedom.”
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ligionandspeakout against contraception. Theywouldplaynopart
in thedecision touse contraception,which is solely amatter for the
woman and her physician. The companies, moreover, could have
avoided anymoral dilemmaby paying a tax instead of providing in-
surance,withemployees theneligible to secure full coverageon the
insurance exchange.
The exercise of religious liberty imposes a burdenon the rights
and health of female employees, whomay not share their employ-
er’s beliefs. If familyplanning servicesbecameunaffordable, the re-
productive autonomyandwell-beingofwomenwouldbeplacedat
risk. At the same time, the company effectively would be treating
femaleemployeesunequally, as therewouldbenocomparable cov-
erage exclusions for men.
Corporate Personhood
Hobby Lobby equates corporationswith “persons” capable of prac-
ticing religion, but corporate personhood is a legal fiction. A corpo-
ration is simply abusiness entity createdby law,whichaffordsown-
ers and shareholders advantages, such as limited liability. The
corporation’s prime purpose is tomake a profit, not to exercise hu-
man freedoms. In exchange for the advantages received, there is
good reason to require corporations to abide by laws of general ap-
plicability, such as administering government benefit schemes and
not discriminating.
The Court’s ruling is limited to “closely held” corporations, but it
neverdefines that term.JusticeAlitoequates“closelyheld”with fam-
ily-ownedbusinesses.Yet90%ofcorporationsarecloselyheld,some
ofwhichare large: forexample,HobbyLobbyhas13 000employees.6
JusticeAlito asserts that publicly traded companieswould notmake
RFRA claims but, if they did, the Court’s reasoning appears to apply
to them. In fact, the Court has conferred rights onmultinational cor-
porations inmultiplerealms—defendingcommercial speechandcam-
paign financing. The trend toward corporate personhood has con-
strainedpublichealthregulation,rangingfromadvertisingprescription
medicines tomarketing junk food, tobacco, and alcohol.7 The Court
has stressed corporate rights, often to the detriment of individuals.
Religious beliefs, moreover, extend beyond abortion—for ex-
ample, opposing vaccinations, blood transfusions, or psychotropic
drugs or objecting to providing health care coverage to same-sex
spouses. Justice Alito asserted thatHobby Lobby does not apply to
thesemedical servicesandwouldnotunderminecivil rights lawsbut
never explained why. The Court’s reasoning could extend to mul-
tiplerealmsofmedicalpractice, leadingJusticeGinsburgtocallHobby
Lobby “a decision of startling breadth.”
Opening the Floodgates of ACA Litigation
If a Supreme Court decision is supposed to give a measure of legal
certainty,Hobby Lobby does anything but that. Currently some 50
cases arepending in thecourts, and theCourt’s decision leaves con-
siderable ambiguity: do large corporations have religious free-
doms, isHHS’accommodationacceptable, anddoes thedecisionap-
ply to medical services beyond contraception?
In Hobby Lobby, the court endorsed an “accommodation,” or
legal exception to the rule, requiring an employer merely to sign
an insurance form stating it is a nonprofit religious organization
that objects to contraception. The day after the case came down,
the Court issued a temporary emergency injunction against
enforcement of this accommodation—provoking a stinging
rebuke from all 3 female justices.8 “Those who are bound by our
decisions usually believe they can take us at our word,” Justice
Sotomayor wrote. “Not so today.” Wheaton, a Christian college,
argued, “signing the formwould impermissibly facilitate abortions
and is therefore forbidden.” (The Court issued a similar order in
favor of Little Sisters of the Poor, an order of Roman Catholic
nuns, in January.) “The Court,” said Sotomayor, ignores a simple
truth: “The government must be allowed to handle the basic tasks
of public administration in a manner that comports with common
sense.”
Hobby Lobby does not undermine the core components of
the ACA such as affordable access to services. The decision, how-
ever, does potentially affect women’s reproductive health and
could signal a “chipping away” at the margins of this historic
health care entitlement. Beyond the ACA, the case solidifies a
growing trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence defending corpo-
rate personhood, which is becoming a major impediment to pub-
lic health regulation.
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